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China is conscious of the fact that projection of power requires dynamic 
maritime strategy and robust naval capabilities. China knows that unless 
it is able to secure its interests in the Indian Ocean it will be difficult to 
sustain economic growth. The land link to the Indian Ocean through 
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China Myanmar 
Economic Corridor (CMEC) are important links to gain access to ports in 
the Indian Ocean but they are not a replacement to the strategic sea lines 
of communication (SLOC). Land links provide additional connectivity 
for economic benefits, but land links do not facilitate projection of power 
to secure vital strategic interests in the vast Indian Ocean Region (IOR). 
Under such circumstances, what is the alternative available to China to 
maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean? To secure vital strategic interests 
in the IOR, China is working on a robust port strategy to maintain a 
permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. Such a strategy will create a 
security dilemma for India especially with Chinese built ports coming 
up in the immediate neighbourhood of India including Chittagong in 
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Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaupkyu in 
Myanmar, Malacca in Malaysia and Mombasa in Kenya.1
Why is China more than eager to maintain its presence in the Indian 
Ocean Region?  China has three strategic challenges: First, to secure 
and maintain uninterrupted movement of its commercial fleet along the 
Indian Ocean SLOCs; second, to keep choke points open and; third, to 
project power if its maritime interests are threatened or compromised. 
The main worry of China is to keep its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean open 
and secured since 40 per cent of China’s overseas trade and 80 per cent 
of its total imports are through the Indian Ocean.2 China’s apprehensions 
arise from the fact that at any point in time there are over 120 warships of 
extra-regional powers deployed in the Indian Ocean in support of various 
missions. Till now the region, by and large, has remained peaceful albeit 
under contestation.3 This competition is likely to increase with extra-
regional powers displaying greater interest in the region for trade and 
energy security. 
China’s Port Strategy in the Indian Ocean Region
Why China is suddenly rushing to the Indian Ocean and acquiring overseas 
ports simultaneously with a naval build-up of historical proportions?4 
China wants the world to believe that its increased interest in the Indian 
Ocean is due to rising commerce and trade with IOR rim countries and 
the threat of non-sta e actors to the SLOCs. But in reality, it seems that 
China’s efforts are directed to securitise the Maritime Silk Route. As a 
result, some of these ports could ultimately become strategic strong points 
for China to maintain its maritime footprints in the IOR. According to 
the Chinese Ministry of Transportation, as of 2018, Chinese companies 
have participated in the construction and operation of a total of 42 
ports in 34 countries under the Silk Road scheme.5 The construction 
and operation of the majority of these ports in the Indian Ocean by the 
Chinese companies obviously is a cause of concern to India and many 












other countries. In fact, overseas military bases are considered an utmost 
necessity of China’s global power dream. The world has already witnessed 
how China through debt trap strategy has acquired few strategic ports 
that could ultimately become maritime strong points to project power 
in the Northern Indian Ocean. There are reports that China is likely 
to establish replenishment, berthing and maintenance bases in foreign 
countries through mutually beneficial and friendly consultations.6
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy defines five functions of 
overseas military bases: projection of power for war, diplomatic signal, 
changed politico-military ideology, building relationships and providing 
facilities for training.7 In pursuance of maritime ambition to project 
power, it is important for PLA Navy to maintain a permanent presence 
in the IOR because China need ports to provide logistic support to its 
fleet and military missions overseas. China has not denied the possibility 
of the creation of “Overseas Strategic Support Bases”8 for replenishment 
of logistics, berthing and maintenance of its fleets operating beyond 
the shores. According to Sun Degang, Associate Research Fellow at 
the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China’s port projects 
along the Indian Ocean will be a comprehensive test of China’s economic 
capabilities, risk prevention and the ability to set the international agenda.9 
Along with the port strategy, China has already begun establishing 
military bases with Djibouti being the first in line of many ports/bases 
that may be in the pipeline in future. In addition, China has intelligence 
sharing agreements with several c untries in the region, including 
reportedly Bangladesh (2018), and presumably Pakistan, though it 
is not clear whether these are limited to counter-terrorism threats or 
include maritime domain information sharing.10 China has also sold two 
submarines to Bangladesh recently and there could be a possibility that 
China may be seeking maritime intelligence through these two submarines 
as well. Kyaukpyu a port that is developed by China in Myanmar is also 
the starting point of a pipeline that could send LNG and oil to China.11 











Is ChIna PreParIng to establIsh IndIan oCean theatre Command at gwadar?
This port is also important for China to maintain its presence in the Bay 
of Bengal that till recently was considered an exclusive domain of India. 
Besides, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port has been taken over by China on 
lease for 99 years extendable to another 99 years. 
Of all, strategically Gwadar is the most significant port for China, 
just 400 km from the important Hormuz Strait, through which 40 per 
cent of Chinese imported crude oil flows.12 Though Pakistan has stated 
that the lease of Gwadar to China is purely for commercial purposes but 
deep-sea port at Gwadar is being prepared for dual purposes. The annual 
traffic has indicated that Gwadar Port is not commercially viable with 
limited vessel traffic. The facade of China and Pakistan was exposed when 
Chinese military sources had spoken about deploying Navy Marines at 
Gwadar and Djibouti to defend Chinese interests overseas.13 Considering 
its strategic location and land link to Tibet, Gwadar is considered a 
strategic strong point of China in the IOR.
China’s Long Term Objective
In 2011, China was forced to evacuate 36,000 Chinese nationals from 
Libya that resulted in abandoning projects worth US$ 20 billion. 
The Libyan fiasco gave China a lesson that it cannot risk such a large 
number of its citizens and billions of dollar investment to threat from 
states and non-state actors. At the same time, such a huge investment 
need security so tha  the losses can be prevented/reduced. By 2030, 
China could have 10 million of its nationals overseas (from the 
current strength of 5.5 million as of date), and US$ 1,000 billion in 
investment abroad.14 The current expansion plan of construction of 
ports and subsequent conversion of these ports into military bases is 
irrefutable and has long term implications for security calculus in the 
IOR. The flip side of port strategy is that there will be more bases of 
China to target in the Indian Ocean itself. Thus China cannot leave 
such a large number of assets exposed to threats from state and non-












state actors, as a result at some point in time, China would certainly 
need a security umbrella in the IOR with fully functional command 
and control headquarters.   
The query that demands attention: Can China establish command 
and control over these ports and military bases from mainland China or 
it would need an advance headquarters in the Indian Ocean to exercise 
direct control over these bases and fleets operating in the IOR? Overseas 
logistic support and maritime operations are complex thus there is a need 
to maintain some command and control elements in IOR so that the fleets 
and military bases do not operate independently of each other. Moreover, 
there is a need to coordinate with host countries and other nations using 
international water for logistic support, change of crew, dealing with 
maritime confrontation and application of force if compelled and not to 
forget addressing certain sovereignty protocols. Given the circumstances, 
PLA Navy may find it difficult to exercise command and control from the 
mainland. Thus sooner or later China would require maritime advance 
Headquarters or IOR Theatre Command positioned at one of the IOR 
Rim countries. 
The options for such a strategic headquarters in Gwadar, Hambantota 
and Djibouti cannot be ruled out. The possibility of establishing it on 
the African East coast is low since it is not in close proximity or astride 
important SLOCs in the IOR. Though Hambantota is close to Malacca 
Strait and SLOCs but Sri Lanka may be a hesitant host. Similarly, Djibouti 
is sandwiched in the narrow Red Sea neither connected by land link nor 
astride SLOCs in the Indian Ocean with little influence over the Strait 
of Hormuz. While Kyaukpyu port is connected to the land link but with 
little or no influence over the strategic SLOCs in the IOR. 
In the overall assessment, Gwadar appears to be a strategic strong 
point that offers China all the required advantages needed for a possible 
command and control headquarters. More importantly, Pakistan is a 
willing host and a strategic partner. Gwadar has the land link, a port 
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for dual purposes and infrastructure for basing large headquarters on the 
shore. In addition, it is astride strategic SLOCs that not only can protect 
energy security and commercial fleet but can also disrupt the supply of 
crude oil to adversaries if push comes to shove. The development of 
Gwadar airport provides China third dimensional capabilities for maritime 
operations. 
Options for India to Build Capabilities in IOR
The advantage at this stage is certainly with India as a resident maritime 
power in the Indian Ocean. But this advantage will slip away if capabilities 
to consolidate maritime domination is not done in time. There may be a 
desire to have minimum of three aircraft carrier groups for sea denial and 
projection of power, but same may not be possible given the resources 
being made available to the defence forces. India must first fill the 
doctrinal gap in its strategy as a resident power in the Indian Ocean. 
Once grand strategy for the Indian Ocean is put in place, the structure of 
theatre command, capabilities required to be a dominant maritime power 
and interoperability issues with extra-regional powers will fall into place. 
Notwithstanding the above, some of the issues that need urgent attention 
are given in the succeeding paragraphs.
Conversion of few strategic islands as unsinkable aircraft carriers 
may be a good option, to begin with, while developing comprehensive 
maritime capabilities will take a long time. Though building islands as 
comprehensive military bases is not a replacement to the aircraft carriers 
because islands are fixed and cannot project power in desired areas, but to a 
great extent, it can provide logistic support, sea surveillance and maritime 
air cover to the fleets operating on high seas. The strategic location of 
Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep offer India with great advantage 
to operate air and naval assets to dominate strategic SLOCs. In addition, 
India needs to hasten up other offshore radar and port facilities in IOR, 
especially in Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. 












There is a debate whether sea denial and sea control will work 
in the Indian Ocean where major sea traffic is in high seas which are 
considered global common? What is the alternative? Basic capabilities 
that India should develop is sea surveillance to affect anti-access or sea 
control. Since in the case of a prolonged conflict, sea control would allow 
credible power projection and maritime trade blockade (against Pakistan) 
and trade intervention (against China).15 Sea control operations need an 
integrated approach and robust maritime capabilities. 
It is always not necessary to compete for ship to ship capabilities when 
other instruments of force are available. There is a need for India to develop 
non-kinetic and hybrid warfare capabilities because that will ultimately reduce 
the use of conventional forces in foreseeable future. Though non-kinetic and 
hybrid capabilities are not a replacement to the conventional maritime forces 
but they can enable and reduce the use of conventional forces to a great 
degree. Non-kinetic and hybrid warfare is as much applicable to maritime 
operations as in the case of land and air operations.
Cultivation of naval cooperation is vital against revisionist rising global 
power like China. India alone cannot deal with rising footprints of China 
in the IOR. Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation 
(IORARC) was a good idea but it has remained only a gathering for 
yearly ritual and has not moved forward to work out a consensus on 
security, use of ports by extra-regional powers to prevent militarisation 
of IOR. The QUAD is one option but inadequate t  cover entire Indo-
Pacific; however, India could operationalise logistical agreements with 
France and the other IOR rim countries and vice versa. In addition, there 
is a need for India to forge cooperative alliance with rim countries to use 
the facilities for surveillance, logistics and intelligence sharing. 
Most of the island nations in the Indian Ocean are economically 
fragile with little inherent capabilities to deal with traditional and non-
traditional threats. In the light of the foregoing, India should endeavour 
to become a net security provider especially to the island nations & 
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IOR Rim countries against non-traditional threats. Even measures 
like building ocean surveillance capabilities can help smaller nations to 
protect their exclusive economic zones and prevention of crime on high 
seas. South Asia is disaster-prone and economically poor countries are not 
in a position to develop exclusive capabilities for effective Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). India can assist in HADR and 
dealing with organised crime on the high sea. India thus needs to project 
soft power to develop bilateral relations and capabilities. If India does not 
step in, China would and that will not be in the interest of India. 
Conclusion
It is a complex issue to manage multiple bases away from the mainland 
especially when there are threats and vulnerabilities from state  and non-
state actors. Wang Tianze, Qi Wenzhe, and Hai Jun, all analysts at the 
Institute of Military Transportation of the PLA, Ground Forces argue 
that: “to protect our ever-growing overseas interests, we will progressively 
establish in Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Kenya and other countries a logistical network 
based on various means, buying, renting, cooperating, to construct 
our overseas bases or overseas protection hubs”.16 The establishment of 
military bases is a foregone conclusion, but what is of interest is how soon 
China will locate their advanced headquarters/IOR Theatre Command 
in any of the rim countries? 
Xue Guifang and Zheng Hao, who argue that efforts are needed to 
“build an international environment that will accept China’s construction 
of overseas bases.”17 Today China is not shy to accept that places of 
strategic nature acquired or managed by China in the IOR could be 
converted into military bases for protection of trade, personnel and 
investment. What is of interest to India is how fast can we lay down a 
maritime grand strategy and how fast India can build capabilities so that 
its interests are not compromised.
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